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Abstract
In the last few decades the concept of self-regulation accompanied the process of dismantling the welfare state. In this
context, in central countries—Europe andNorth America—the importance given to private regulations versus public action
increased, thus requiring new mechanisms of legitimacy. To this end, appeals to the principles of economy and technical
efficiency to legitimate private regulations have been made by several researchers. However, these principles acquired a
negative view in Argentina because they were used to use to legitimate processes that led to various crises, especially tak-
ing into consideration the neo-liberal experience of the 1990s. Against this historical background, this paper seeks to show
a particular case of legitimizing the self-regulation of non-state organizations (social clubs) by using classic topoi, which had
been historically used to legitimize state action. In order to do so, this text focuses on the analysis of “Luna de Avellaneda”
Act of 2007, by which the government of Buenos Aires sought to legitimize the self-regulation of clubs appealing to the
classical values of democracy, participation, and solidarity. For this, the historical experience of the Argentinean political
community will be observed from the perspective of the history of these clubs, thus recovering the social function they
played in the diverse political and economic crises.
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1. Introduction
In the last fewdecades of the twentieth century, the state
was thought of as a phenomenon in crisis and, conse-
quently, underwent a process of dismantling that spread
rapidly throughout the world. In this historical context,
the concept of self-regulation, which had a long tradition
in Anglo-Saxon culture, would reappear as a way of think-
ing about legal regulation outside of statehood (Bartle &
Vass, 2007). Thus, one way of redefining self-regulation
would be expressed as “the private provision of public
goods and private redistribution that takes place outside
the institutions of government and, hence, in the realm
of private rather than public politics” (Baron, 2010).
As can be observed, the logical structure of self-
regulation pays particular attention both to the juridi-
cal form of regulation (public and private) and to the
agents who promote it (State or society). However, the
main drawback of the concept lies not only in differen-
tiating between the producer of self-regulation and its
legal form. Rather, it manifests itself in considering the
main substance of self-regulation: the phenomenon that
involves regulating human behavior.
In that sense, since every “regulation contains the
idea of control by a superior; [and] it has a directive
function” (Ogus, 2004, p. 2), the production and execu-
tion of an order requires a legitimacy of the “superior”—
whether public or private. Thus, the legitimacy of the self-
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regulation becomes fundamental not only for the analy-
sis of the concept, but also to shape it.
Now, since the very concept of legitimacy has tradi-
tionally been conceptualized in a state-based manner,
mainly for the legitimacy of nation-state government
(Stillman, 1974), it is convenient here to use the broad
definition stated by Easton, who considers legitimacy as
“the conviction on the part of the member that it is right
and proper…to accept and obey the authorities” (Easton,
1965). Thus, the legitimacy of self-regulation in this new
historical context raises the question as to which argu-
ments are available to justify the establishment and obe-
dience of the members of a community to a regulation
that comes from an authority other than the state gov-
ernment (private actors).
Traditionally, in central countries, state regulations
had been legitimized on the basis of being the result of
a democratic and rational-legal process that looked at
the general welfare. In contrast, in order to provide le-
gitimacy to self-regulation, it was pointed out as justi-
fying advantages: the low cost of self-regulation in con-
trast with public regulation (Ogus, 1995), the efficiency
in its application, and the consideration of self-regulation
as “more knowledgeably-informed than direct state or
legal regulation” (King, 2007, p. 72). These arguments,
however, have been criticized for highlighting the lack of
transparency of these regulations and the lack of legiti-
macy to apply them, requiring, in many cases, the sup-
port of the state to enable and guard them.
In Argentina, the typical arguments used to legitimize
self-regulation of privates do not enjoy a good reputa-
tion. In fact, these principles are easily recognized by
the population as the arguments that served to dismem-
ber the welfare state, which led to an economic, polit-
ical, and social crisis with severe consequences for the
citizenry (Svampa, 2005). Under these particular circum-
stances, the way of legitimizing self-regulation tends to
differ from what has occurred in central countries. This
perception leads to some questions: can all forms of
self-regulation be legitimized by appealing to the princi-
ples of economy, effectiveness, and special knowledge of
non-state agencies? Are the arguments used in the cen-
tral countries to legitimize self-regulation expandable to
the diverse cultural spaces around the world? Are there
other arguments available to legitimize self-regulation of
civil society organizations?
Based on these questions, the objective of this es-
say will be to show how in the year 2007 the Buenos
Aires provincial government sought to legitimize the self-
regulation exercised by social clubs in times of neo-
liberal state crisis (1999–2007) using a state-like regula-
tion (Luna de Avellaneda Act). From this norm, the ef-
fectiveness of the use of classic topoi will be discussed,
that is, topoi traditionally linked to justify state regula-
tions (democracy, participation, solidarity), to legitimize
the self-regulation of the civil society organizations. Both
objectives can be synthesized in a hypothesis postulat-
ing that the effectiveness of transplanting the arguments
used to legitimize diverse forms of self-regulation from
central countries depends on their adaptation to the his-
torical memory of the political community of reception.
To achieve this objective, this paper uses two
methodological strategies. The first is the historical re-
construction of the experience of self-regulation in so-
cial clubs and their relationship with the state in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (section 2). Further-
more, a recovery of the experience of social contain-
ment that social clubs fulfilled during the crisis of 2001,
practicing some particular forms of self-regulation (sec-
tion 3), will be undertaken, and this will serve as the back-
ground against which to understand the system of values
historically settled in the Argentine political community
that were later used by the state to legitimize the self-
regulation of the clubs. The second, based on critical dis-
course analysis, seeks to study the topoi and arguments
used in the Luna de Avellaneda Act. This will allow us to
see how classical values of public political legitimacy can
be used to justify the self-regulation of civil society in-
stitutions (section 4). Finally, this analysis seeks to show
how the governmentmade strategic use of the clubs’ his-
tory in order to recover the lost legitimacy of the state
after a period of neo-liberal politics (conclusions).
2. Social Clubs and Nation-State: The History of
a Tension
Among the various non-state self-regulation experiences
that can be traced in Argentine history (knowledge soci-
eties, transport companies, etc.), social clubs deserve to
be highlighted for two reasons. In the first place, it shall
be remarked that the experiences of the administrative-
economic self-regulation were mostly carried out by
transnational companies, which reduced the role of reg-
ulatory agency responsible for overseeing Argentinean
companies to the mere application of regulations de-
signed abroad. Second, the self-regulation of clubs is part
of a long history of associations in Argentina; a history de-
fined by a tension between the action of civil society and
the state (private and public–private regulations). The
latter motive influences the degree of self-regulation of
clubs in civil society, which sees associations as nuclei of
social containment and practical organization that have
become as naturalized as the state. Thus, the history of
the clubs becomes fundamental when trying to under-
stand the process of naturalization involved in this spe-
cific form of self-regulation.
More precisely, social clubs in Argentina have played
a key role in shaping and modeling society as well as in
helping to build the citizenry (González Bernaldo, 2008).
Even prior to the creation of the nation-state, associative
movements served as placeswhere political partieswere
constituted (Sábato, 2004). They also secured and re-
inforced immigrant communities, integrating them into
the new country by forging a bond between the var-
ious cultures. The creation of some rules for mutual
assistance—outside the scope of the state—started in
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the nineteenth century with “Associations of Mutual
Help”, which provided health insurance and took care of
widows who were members of those institutions. Dur-
ing the initial organizational stage, they were clearly in-
fluenced by the immigrant movements, and their mem-
bers were reunited under the appeal for their national-
ity of origin—Italians, Spaniards—(i.e. Sociedad Italiana
de Ayuda Mutual). Even though their internal regula-
tions did not received formal recognition by the state,
the effectiveness of the social protection they provided
granted them the support of politicians, who were usu-
ally seen as proudmembers of these associations (Di Ste-
fano, Sábato, Romero, & Moreno, 2002).
During the first half of the twentieth century, af-
ter the nationalization process—characterized as a cul-
tural process where extensive public education created
the Argentinean emotive core of nationalism—the role
of these associations changed: whereas they had previ-
ously served a communal function, based on nationality
of origin, they developed a territorial role and focused
on the infrastructural development of the new neigh-
borhoods created on the periphery of Buenos Aires. In
this process, the main goal was to improve the cultural
and material living conditions of the local population, a
task which was reflected in the very name they acquired:
development associations (Asociaciones de Fomento). In
this period, connection to the local government was
strengthened, and they both worked together and reg-
ulated the public works for the community, which in-
cluded building most of the new infrastructure of neigh-
borhoods (private–public creation of public goods). It is
worth remembering that during this period these institu-
tions were strategically characterized as “non-political”
by their holders, even when a proto-democracy in the
electiveness of their authorities was practiced (Romero
& de Privitellio, 2005).
During the second half of the twentieth century, both
self-regulation and the key role played by these institu-
tions in providing public goods were drastically reduced
by the actions of the Peronist state. In 1945 they be-
gan to be displaced from that role by the party’s polit-
ical apparatus (unidades básicas), which held a central
position connecting the needs of the population to the
state. As a consequence, the institutions’ regulatory abil-
ity decreased, and they became chiefly a place to prac-
tice sports, thus changing their names once again to “So-
cial Clubs”. In those years the Argentinean welfare-state
was created and politics in clubs almost disappeared. It
should also be pointed out that those institutions that
did not follow Peronist orders were subject to interven-
tion and pressured by the state (Rein, 2015).
During dictatorships the a-political character tradi-
tionally taken up by the clubs had worked as a shel-
ter against direct intervention from de facto regimes. In
terms of self-regulation, while the so-called bureaucratic-
authoritarian state established in 1966 fostered the de-
velopment of transnational private-regulations chiefly in
the field of economy, it forbade any manifestation of pri-
vate regulations and reclamations by any social institu-
tions under suspicion of disrupting political abuses. Thus,
the regulative power of clubs in connection with the pro-
vision of public goods was nearly erased.
At this point, the tension between the welfare-state,
the bureaucratic-authoritarian state and clubs becomes
evident and shows how the political context influenced
the possibilities of self-regulation by local institutions.
However, it should be stressed that the bond between
clubs and local neighbors was far from disappearing. De-
spite the prohibition to do politics during dictatorships,
the role playedby clubs strengthened theirmembers’ col-
lective memory, which turned clubs into one of the most
important socialization spaces of the twentieth century.
During the 1989–2001 neo-liberal regime, the ten-
sion between the state control and self-regulation was
reconfigured, and both components of the equation—
clubs and state—suffered from the dismantling of the
welfare-state. The privatization of public companies,
such as oil, gas, telephone, water and heavy industry
companies, and the opening of the market economy
without proper protection of the Argentinean industry,
produced unprecedentedly high unemployment rates
(Veigel, 2009). This disastrous economic situation was
accompanied by a decline in labor solidarity, expressed
by the instauration of the ideological presupposition
that each individual is responsible for his or her own
salvation—winner or loser—and attacked the traditional
labor and social bonds (Novaro, 2006). In this novel con-
text, clubs became fundamental and paradoxical. Owing
to the discredit of social enterprises under the new ide-
ological paradigm of privatization as well as the incapa-
bility of ex-workers to pay the fees required to maintain
their facilities, these institutions barely managed to sur-
vive. Still, in the face of the dominance of the neo-liberal
discourse, and the lack of responses from political in-
stitutions, they were the only places where the sudden
absence of the state could be resisted and were trans-
formed into places where common neighborhood prob-
lems could be shared (Lewcowicz, 2004). Social clubs, es-
pecially after the crisis in 2001 and particularly in the pe-
riphery of the city of Buenos Aires—where most of the
impoverished former middle-class unemployed workers
lived—recreated the old territorial solidarity, and, once
again, gaining enormous social, economic and political
relevance.
3. From Political Collapse to Private Self-Regulation
(2001–2007)
For the Argentinean population, 2001 possesses a very
differentmeaning then it does for the rest of thewestern
world. In fact, the attack on the World Trade Center was
of lesser significance to Argentina’s population than the
image of President De la Rua leaving the Casa Rosada by
helicopter. The sequence of events involving economic
collapse, the closure of the main banks, the IMF’s refusal
to give credit after a decade of orthodox economic poli-
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cies were nothing other than a preamble to social disobe-
dience and revolt by the population (Fradkin, 2002). So-
cial revolt was not only a reaction to economic unrest but
an expression against neo-liberalism, the endangering of
democratic values caused by technocrats and the insti-
tutional irresponsibility of professional politicians (Levey,
Ozarow, & Wylde, 2014).
In purely economic terms, the collapse of the na-
tional economy in 2001 isolated the country from the
global economy and erased the federal-state order. Thus,
provincial governments had to take control of the situ-
ation by implementing several extraordinary measures,
themost important ofwhichwas the issuance of bonds—
quasi money—to help support specific groups but not
the population at large. In Buenos Aires this “money”
was used to pay the salaries of civil servants, public
school teachers and police forces, among others (Col-
liac, 2005). However, this exceptional currency policy did
not entail any gain or profit for the huge mass of unem-
ployedpeoplewho lived in BuenosAires. For them, itwas
bartering clubs—inside a provincial network—that pro-
vided a means to survival. Most of these social projects
were emplaced in “community and cultural centers” (so-
cial clubs), where the activitieswere tightly regulated not
only through the use of privately-created currency (cred-
its) but also by delimiting the economical practices of
their members. In fact, the clubs established several de-
tailed exchange regulations, which led the newspaper La
Nación to issue a 2001 notice entitled “The strict rules of
bartering clubs” (La Nación, 2001). For example, it was
mandated that only those over 18 years of age with a
presentation of certificates of bromatology—in the case
of food could participate in the bartering. It also stipu-
lated that they must attend at least three meetings per
year, and they also have to provide a balance sheet of
their transactions. These regulations were formulated
by the nodos, by the clubs themselves (private regula-
tion) and, sometimes, in connection with the municipal-
ity (private–public regulation). Nevertheless, the direct
initiative always came from private actors who needed
to exchange goods.
Although most of rules for these “nodos” were com-
posed by a larger bartering association, local clubs be-
came the epitome of new survival trade practicing, de-
marking a new model of socio-economic self-regulation
outside the State and global market (Pearson, 2003).
Moreover, economic self-regulation, expressed in
norm-setting that impacted the lives of those in the
neighborhoods, was not the only form of reaction that
took place within the context of the clubs. The politi-
cal breakdown andmistrust of professional politicians re-
flected in ¡Que se vayan todos! (“Get them all to leave!”)
enabled the creation of neighborhood assemblies (asam-
bleas barriales) with a clear anti-institutional yet politi-
cal ethos (Dinerstein, 2003). Clubs became places to de-
bate general politics as well as to think about and solve
local problems without state intervention. Most of the
people spoke about how to foster the “common good”
in neighborhoods, and they created a horizontal prac-
tice of democracy from the bottom up (Pagina12, 2002).
The role of political debate was central, because self-
regulation not only fulfills a function of provision of com-
mon goods in the production of written regulations, but
also in the process of producing them. In this process the
political practice limited the existence of free riders and
allowed the rebuilding of social tissue through the partici-
pation and solidarity of those involved in political debate
(Baron, 2010).
In short, in the face of political and social emergency,
social clubs took control of the situation on a small scale
and provided a place to restore social bonds through bar-
tering and establishing communal relationships. At this
point, it should be remembered that in the absence of
the state, clubs played a major role in the regulation of
social interchange, and this was probably attributable to
the historical presence of these institutions, which were
easily recognized by the local citizenry. In fact, their ac-
tions were naturalized without appeal to a process of
discourse legitimacy. As they were the only visible insti-
tutions, neighbors got involved in clubs to confront the
crisis. Nevertheless, after the crisis subsided, their self-
regulatory practices were recognized, especially once
the institutional political order tried to resume its lost
competence and legitimacy as provider of the “common
good” to society. In this context, a law to protect social
clubs was enacted in 2007 under the emotive title, “Luna
de Avellaneda”.
4. “Luna de Avellaneda”: The Emotional Rebuilding of
State Legal Order
After six years of social and economic recovery, mis-
trust towards professional politicianswhoworked for the
state apparatus started to diminish. Nevertheless, the
new provincial government, formed by Peronist politi-
cians who had once belonged to the neo-liberal regime,
was in need of new strategies to regain the legitimacy of
its power in the face of a self-regulated citizenry. Thus,
in order to recover some of the functions fulfilled by so-
cial clubs during neo-liberal times, the government could
not appeal to the traditional methods: dissolution of civil
societies or intervention. The government lacked the in-
frastructure and the capability to resume the daily tasks
that clubs carried out, and politicians lacked popular le-
gitimacy to endorse such kind of actions. They were seen
not as members of the true political activity but as ene-
mies of the people.
In this new context, the balance of power between
civil society and government seemed to lean toward the
former. Consequently, to avoid this contradiction, the
government presented itself as the “protector” of civil
society organizations rather than as opposing the clubs.
In order to accomplish this complex task, a new law was
enacted. The project “Luna de Avellaneda” was passed
by Congress and published in the Boletín Oficial on De-
cember 17, 2007. This new Act No. 13747 established a
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system of preservation—no taxation, social fees for gas
and electricity services, and so on—for all historical so-
cial institutions, including clubs and public libraries. This
way the link between civil society and local state gov-
ernments wanted to be re-created and, in order to fulfill
such goal and to obtain the support of the population, at
least three discursive strategies were displayed. Firstly,
an emotive appeal was made to “common sense” about
the positive side of politics, and in order to achieve this,
the government capitalized from a popular and success-
ful movie that related the history of clubs in neo-liberal
times (pathos). Secondly, the new law made use of a dis-
tinctive narration of the past, which recounts and high-
lights only a few select stages in the history of clubs in
Argentina, so as to rebuild the relationship between state
and civil society, which is represented in terms of the
clubs. Finally, the lawmade a plea for the positive values
upheld by the clubs (democracy, participation, solidar-
ity, and social integration), which would not only serve
as topoi to legitimize their self-regulation, but also—in
the interest of creating a bond between the state and
its citizenry—as “common values” shared by post neo-
liberal politicians and the civil society.
4.1. Movie and Emotional Pathos: “Luna de Avellaneda”
From a traditional legal perspective, it is shocking to find
out that in Argentina even when associations or civil or-
ganizations have been constitutionally recognized, the
new law makes no reference to the Constitution. This
shows that the argumentative form could not rely on tra-
ditional legal discourses. On the contrary, the whole nar-
rative rested on a more effective discourse based on an
emotional appeal to history. To achieve this, the primary
sources used were neither statistics, nor sociological or
administrative studies, but rather an image projected by
the successful Argentinean movie Luna de Avellaneda
(released in 2004). The main plot of this movie was the
internal conflict experienced in the club “Luna de Avel-
laneda” between its local “honest” president and a “cor-
rupt” local politician, who wanted to sell the club’s facil-
ities to build a casino. As remarked in the Act itself, this
tension was presented as a synthesis of a long conflict
involving issues of moral legitimacy inside Argentinean
society. After the film’s success, not only was the Act
named after it, but the whole argumentation relied on
the image it projected. In fact, in themain text of the Act,
it was stated that: “the movie ‘Luna de Avellaneda’ won-
derfully portrays, from an artistic viewpoint, the history
of this problem”.1
This preeminent source presupposed a selection of
a specific emotional discourse used to narrate the past.
But this narrative not only employed an eloquent strat-
egy, it also expressed certain “common knowledge”
about the audience of the message that can help un-
veil the ground that laid underneath a special “use” of
the past to reconcile government and civil society in
the present. If the film narrative was taken to be the
truth, history then no longer seems to rely on histori-
ans’ reconstructions—which might interfere with the le-
gitimacy process by criticizing the tension between Pero-
nism and clubs—but rather on a memory stimulated by
emotion. Therefore, present demands could be better
answered through partial explanations loaded with emo-
tiveness rather than with facts (Nora, 2008).
The cinema–memory–story triangle represents the
narrative ground on which the new law could unfold sev-
eral topics to justify the defense of the social clubs. This
use of an “emotional image” looked for a pathos that re-
sponded to a “knowledge of belief”, which can be sum-
marized by an emotional representation chargedwith so-
cial andmoral sensitivity in the community (Charaudeau,
2011). Based on this emotive appeal, some uses of the
past and some topoiwere recollected to legitimize social
clubs and, by extension, to clean up the image of their
self-declared protector.
4.2. A Short History of Two Enemies: Dictatorships and
Neo-Liberal Politicians
The movie produced a synecdoche effect through which
civil society is represented as pure, well-intentioned and
naïve opposite the institutional order. Therefore, the
anti-institutional spirit of a time was inscribed in its
ethos. Now, since the new law wanted to present po-
litical actors as also sharing the common problem ex-
perienced by civil society, the text intended to oppose
society and the political system with two potential ene-
mies of the clubs: dictatorships and neo-liberal regimes.
Thus, the historical reconstruction employed in the Act—
and evoked by the movie—was directed against those
two main oppositional figures, eclipsing the internal ten-
sion experienced by clubs under the Peronist state. This
oblivion was based on the conflicted position of the gov-
ernment, because most of their members belonged to
the Peronist party that installed the neo-liberal regime in
the 1990s. Consequently, the attempt to distance them-
selves from their own conflicted pastwas secured by con-
fronting past dictatorships and by the reestablishment
of the anti-liberal tradition of this political party as well.
Following this intention, the history of the clubs was re-
duced in the text to just the emergency they experienced
from 1860 to 1930 (genetic history), then jumping to the
recent memory of their political and financial crisis un-
der the various dictatorships and during the 1990s (re-
cent history). The selection then concealed the opposi-
tion against Peronism (1945–1955) and avoided attack-
ing the legitimacy of the new protection the state was
now trying to provide. The genetic history was in fact
used to show the emergence of the “good” values rep-
resented by clubs and civil society, while the depiction
of recent history was meant to show the decline of their
values owing to the harassment by dictators and neo-
liberalist regimes.
1 All translations are ours.
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Consequently, with the displacement of the contra-
diction between state and social clubs by the two ad-
ministrative and antidemocratic models of government
(neo-liberal technocracy andmilitary regimes), twomain
topics clearly emerged. First of all, in opposition to dicta-
torships, “democracy” appeared as a solid historical se-
mantic stratum which recalled the struggle for human
rights and the return to political-democratic order in Ar-
gentina. Nevertheless, democracy alone was unable to
reestablish the role of the state as protector since it had
been ineffective during the neo-liberal program. There-
fore, the topic of “solidarity”, especially in the context of
social concerns, was used as a counter-concept against
individualism and egoism, which came to characterize
neo-liberal regimes after the fall of 2001.
4.3. Schools of Democracy and Solidarity: Clubs as a
Moral Example
“Democratic life” was a central topic that ran through the
history of clubs revisited by the new law. In its narration,
we find the following statement:
Clubs were “schools of democracy”, in such a way
that their inner life was much more transparent
and exemplary than the life of political power. Even
during the darkest and most dreadful dictatorships,
clubs continued voting and electing their authorities
democratically.
The topos of democracy turns out to play a central role
in the hegemonic discourse of current Argentinean so-
ciety, and it appeals to recent history in order to re-
store faith in traditional politics. It serves not only as a
premise for a righteous state government, but also as
an instrument to resist an extended tendency towards
authoritarian behavior. To this extent, it is an example
of a significant tool used in the present to judge his-
torical processes. However, this concept has not always
been quite so influential. In fact, over the course of the
twentieth century, democratic principles in Argentina—
theoretically defended by dictators and political parties
alike—were not resisted to the extent as is currently be-
ing portrayed. Both parts were so intertwined that civil
society viewedmilitary forces as political actors (Quiroga,
2004). After 1983, notions of “democracy” and “partici-
pation”, historically speaking, served one primary func-
tion: to restore the public sphere and enable civil soci-
ety to be involved into politics in the wake of the last
dictatorship (1976–1983). In this fashion, talk of democ-
racy was used to vindicate the role of civil society in the
face of state-dictatorship. Since 2001 the political activi-
ties of the clubs have primarily involved the recognition
and defense of these values, which legitimized their anti-
institutional as true spaces for doing politics. However,
the opposition to dictatorshipsworked also had its down-
sides, because in democratic times therewas no justifica-
tion to resist the institutional state order.
However, it was clear that democracy was not
enough. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble of the
Act, we find the following sentence:
These institutions do not possess a lucrative goal, be-
cause in their Statutes their only goal is the “common
good”, and they have been, and still are, a huge part of
people’s social and cultural heritage, preventing until
today the market from altering their social and com-
munal goals.
The tension between the clubs and the market is clear in
this statement. According to this perspective, clubs were
the only places where altruistic values, such as socializa-
tion, social bonds, the organization of civil society, and in-
tegration, were still present. To find these elements the
“genetic history” needed to portray tradition and market
in terms of an opposition. The law states:
Argentina would not be what it is if clubs had not
accomplished their socializing role. Clubs developed
themselves, acquired proper identities, and strength-
ened the organization of the civil society. [Immigrants]
consolidated their social bonds with the new place
through the creation of their own institutions. Sev-
eral clubs founded by popular sectorsmanaged to sur-
vive, to organize, to issue their own regulations, to
establish rules, and to integrate the neighborhood in
their activities and objectives. These old clubs fulfilled
the function of recreation, social assistance, and so-
cial security.
This history was rapidly connectedwith the present, skip-
ping over some historical events. In 2007 the “privatiza-
tion of the social cost” and the reduction of citizens to
mere consumers were seen as symptoms of the disap-
pearance of the state; in this context, clubs regained their
original function in re-generating a social bond based on
solidarity. Thus, the historical stratum was linked to the
failed neo-liberal experience, and it was reactivated to
justify private-regulation by the clubs in the face of a re-
treating state.
In short, according to the text in the Act, after the
crisis of 2001, civil society found itself devoid of a demo-
cratic welfare-state, and thus the tension between state
and civil society changed as the result of a new dialectic,
where these once antithetical elements were reunited
in a common front against the “market”. As a conse-
quence, the restoration of the state worked as a basis
from which to protect the “good” values of civil soci-
ety and as an assurance against the foreign capitalism,
which “perverted” those traditional good values. In this
way, clubs were reintroduced as parts of a state standing
against the two common enemies, and the state could fi-
nally be presented as the “protector” of society’s “good
values”. Moreover, in terms of the legitimacy of regula-
tory practices, after the crisis the self-regulation model
was converted into a private–public regulation, and the
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state was able to regain its lost capacity to help civil soci-
ety by supporting clubs.
5. Conclusions
In view of all this, it is worth mentioning that, in order
to explore the legitimization of private or private–public
regulation, the historical context in which legitimacy dis-
courses are expressed cannot be ignored. Nevertheless,
this contextual framework cannot only be taken in a syn-
chronic dimension, but it should also explore the emo-
tional memory condensed in the legitimacy devices used
by the narrator. In the case of Argentina during the 1990s,
the language used to justify the privatization model of
the neo-liberal politics (efficiency, celerity) had a histori-
cal relationship with the theory of the state subsidiarity
defended during dictatorships. However, only after the
crisis of 2001 could this historical stratum be recovered,
and it permitted the connection of the two experiences.
In this sense, somewords and termswhich could be seen
as neutral in Europe have, in Argentina’s local tradition, a
rather distinctive meaning, immediately associated with
the dramatic episodes still imprinted in people’smemory.
More specifically, it is only through history that we can
understand the misunderstanding concerning the exten-
sive use of what in Europe could be seen as the “anti-
quated” language of the 1960s and 1970s. This dimen-
sion may be fully appreciated in the topoi used to jus-
tify the self-regulative role of clubs (democracy, solidar-
ity, participation), which resemble idealized alternative
experiences to the neo-liberal order.
However, recovering the semantic stratum of values
used as topoi is not enough. The pragmatic aspects of dis-
courses need to be revealed in order to understand the
political meaning hidden in the 2007 tension between
public power and private regulation as well as the selec-
tion of these topoi (Palti, 2014). It is only against the back-
ground of this aspect that the sense of Act No. 13747 can
be fully understood. In fact, even though the government
praised the private-regulation exercised by the clubs, its
real intention was to diminish their political power. This
dual scheme was realized by acknowledging the positive
actions by the club in the past—retrospective legitimacy
of private regulation—while at the same time emphasiz-
ing the subsidiary role they play once normality has been
reestablished—prospective legitimacy of public regula-
tion. Theoretically, the redemptive position of the state
in the future was attained by minimizing local participa-
tion and opposing neo-liberal projects.
In short, reducing the state or regaining its hege-
monic role was inscribed in the differentiation between
a recovery of good politics versus an egocentric econ-
omy. Under this scheme, the idealistically objectified sep-
aration between state and civil society became blurred.
Thus, regaining state functions has been seen as a way
of helping civil society by disregarding the traditional ten-
sion involved the dichotomies. This form of logic has had
some effects on self-regulation and, beyond this, on the
history of the state in Argentina, where the pendulous
movement between state and private regulation is still
very much in motion.
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